
Public Rail Now Statement on Proposed Norfolk Southern–Union Pacific Merger
Re-Regulation or Renationalization
Public Rail Now has a multitude of
concerns with the proposed merger of two gigantic rail corporations. Our position
is currently one of hesitation and cynicism that this is a merger to benefit the public and is more
about mass congealing of private capital consolidating power to benefit a few. The proposal will not only put rail workers in the crosshairs of shareholder profits, but also risk the safety
of trackside communities in the name of
cost-cutting. It will exploit
shippers and downgrade the already sad service the freight rail industry is touting they provide.
While we think there is a benefit
to having an efficient coast to coast freight rail network, we are not optimistic this merger bodes well for anyone but the shareholders. This is a public interest crisis: this is about control of essential infrastructure, not just about corporate mergers.
This merger opens the opportunity to discuss:
●
Re-regulation – Trying to patch the broken system of private ownership with stricter rate controls, service obligations,
labor protections, and safety rules — but still leaving railroads in the hands of Wall Street.
●
Renationalization (Public Ownership) – Taking the rail network
back into democratic, public control so that decisions about service, safety,
and labor are made for the
public good, not quarterly earnings.
The Monopoly Problem:
The U.S. rail system has been
reduced to a regionally fragmented duopoly, where chronic short staffing
and safety compromises put workers and communities at risk, service
for small shippers is unreliable, trains are excessively long, and consumers
ultimately pay the price. The Staggers Rail Act of 1980
deregulated most of the freight rail industry, allowing railroads to set rates and abandon service with minimal
government oversight. Before Staggers, there were 40 Class I freight railroads; today there are only six.
For over a decade, rail carriers
have embraced “Precision Scheduled Railroading” (PSR) — corporate shorthand
for running fewer, longer trains with fewer workers to lower the operating ratio and boost
profits. Since PSR’s
rise in 2012,
the rail workforce has been slashed by
17%, less-profitable lines and service stops have been cut, and communities have
lost access to essential freight service. Profits have soared — but instead of
investing in infrastructure upgrades,
expanding service, or transitioning to cleaner Tier 4 or electrified
yard locomotives in marginalized communities, the Class I railroads have
funneled cash to shareholders. From 2010 to 2020, they spent $196 billion on stock buybacks, ignoring a 2007
Association of American
Railroads study calling for $135 billion in capacity expansion to meet 2035 demand.
Now, in a repeat of this pattern,
rail executives are eyeing an $85 billion Norfolk Southern–Union Pacific merger
— even as the recent Canadian Pacific–Kansas City Southern merger cost $31
billion. The consequences are predictable: more job cuts, more de-skilling, more service cuts,
and more unsafe
cost-cutting, all while
shareholder profits soar. This merger is not about building a stronger national
rail network — it’s about
concentrating private wealth and power. Which brings us to the real question for the public:
Will we keep trying to patch this broken private
monopoly system with limited
re-regulation, or will we finally reclaim
our railroads under public ownership, where service, safety,
and jobs come before shareholder dividends?
Impacts on Railroad Workers:
The consolidation of 40 Class 1s
into 6 regional monopolies have left the rail working labor force in shambles.
In 1975 the rail industry
employed about 500,000
workers. The deregulation of the industry
after the Staggers
Act was passed
led to substantial reduction
in the rail workforce. By the early 2000s, the rail industry employed 250,000. Currently the Bureau of Labor Statistics (if it can be considered reliable anymore) reports
less than 153,000 for May 2025.
With this merger, we would expect
the jobs cuts and de-skilling to continue in the face of crew reductions, automation, and contract
labor outsourcing. All the above undermines safety, because experienced
judgment is replaced with automated or scripted processes creating safety issues for the remaining
workers and ultimately impacting trackside
communities. The loss of railroaders equates to a reduction in union membership thus weakening collective bargaining power.
Impacts on Service:
Past mergers have set the precedent for the current expectations.
Mergers, consolidation, and deregulation over the past 45 years have shrunk the U.S. freight
rail network from 240,000 miles of track to just 140,000, concentrating service
on the most profitable routes while abandoning rural and small-town communities.
For shippers, fewer rail options means diminished bargaining power and higher
rates — costs that ripple through the economy to farmers, manufacturers, and
consumers in the form of higher prices. As rail competition disappears, price gouging becomes
easier, service quality declines, and delivery times grow
less reliable.
At the same time, freight
monopolies have used consolidation to justify deferred maintenance and unsafe
cost-cutting. They run longer, heavier
trains on aging infrastructure while slashing inspections, crews, and safety protocols — putting workers, communities, and the environment at greater risk. For passengers, the picture is equally
grim: freight carriers routinely delay Amtrak and commuter trains, refuse to prioritize passenger
service, and in some cases have eliminated access entirely. A merged Norfolk
Southern–Union Pacific would
deepen these harms,
reducing competitive pressure
to keep
prices fair, operations
safe, and schedules reliable — while maximizing profits for shareholders at the public’s expense.
Impacts on Shippers and Consumers:
Rail is the most efficient and cost-effective way to move freight. Shipping
accounts for 10–40% of the cost of many commodities, and moving goods
by rail is 3–5 times
cheaper per ton-mile than by truck. Yet mergers, consolidation, and deregulation have gutted the
network — reduced mileage of
track, eliminated deliveries and stops, congested mainlines, and slashed the
workforce. These changes have forced more shippers to turn to long-haul
trucking just to ensure timely
delivery. In agriculture alone, rail’s share
of freight has fallen
27% since 2000, with trucks absorbing nearly all the growth in the sector.
The result: higher shipping costs that are passed
directly to consumers.
Exorbitant freight rates impact us
all. Studies show that increased rail service and frequency could save U.S. shippers — and therefore consumers — up to $100 billion annually. But today’s deregulated rail monopolies choose monopoly pricing
and cost-cutting over public benefit, operating like 21st-century robber barons
to pad the pockets of shareholders at the expense of workers, communities, and
the economy.
Broken
Regulatory System
The
Staggers Rail Act was built on a false premise: that market competition would
discipline rates and service without strong federal oversight. While it left a
skeletal framework to guard against monopoly
abuse, those safeguards have been gutted in
practice. Decades of mergers have eliminated competition, leaving most
shippers “captive” to a single carrier.
These shippers have almost no practical recourse
— the burden of proof lies entirely on them to challenge excessive rates, a process that costs hundreds
of thousands of dollars, takes years, and only applies to that one case. Even a “win” changes
nothing for other shippers facing the same price gouging, driving more
freight onto highways.
The Surface
Transportation Board — already short-staffed, with two of its five seats vacant —
operates as a revolving door,
with over a third of its former
regulators and staff
going on to work
for the railroads they once oversaw. Board majorities have repeatedly sided with
industry, and enforcement is reactive and weak. Safety oversight fares no better: the Federal
Railroad Administration often lags far behind emerging hazards, relies
on carriers to
self-report,
and imposes fines so minimal they are treated as just another cost of doing
business. This is not a regulatory system capable of protecting workers,
shippers, or the public interest in the face of an $85 billion mega-merger.
This merger exposes the core flaw in the current system:
we are trying to regulate 21st-century monopolies with a hollowed-out, 1980s-era framework that assumes
competition exists. When
competition is gone, when regulators are captured, and when safety and service are sacrificed for stock
buybacks, the public is left with two choices.
We could try Re-Regulation — rebuilding real oversight with enforceable service obligations, rate controls, labor
protections, and meaningful safety enforcement. Or we can pursue
Renationalization — bringing the rail network back under democratic, public ownership so that decisions about service,
infrastructure, and jobs are made for the public good, not for quarterly earnings.
This merger makes one thing clear: doing nothing is not
an option.
This Merger Demands Structural Change
The problem
isn’t just this deal — it’s a system that allows a handful of private corporations to control critical national
infrastructure, while shareholders and hedge fund managers fill their stock
portfolios and bank accounts.
Current laws and regulations are
incapable of protecting workers, shippers, passengers, or the public interest because they were
enacted for a competitive market that no longer exists. After decades of mergers, the few remaining rail
monopolies face no real competition.
The STB and the FRA are both toothless and impotent to enact any beneficial change to a multi-billion dollar industry that is literally
the foundation of the US economy.
In this environment, consolidation doesn’t just slip through the cracks — it flourishes. If regulators could
not or would not stop the $31 billion Canadian
Pacific–Kansas City Southern merger from further
concentrating market power, there is little reason to believe they will protect the public from the far larger $85 billion Norfolk Southern–Union Pacific deal. Without
structural change, this merger will simply accelerate the cycle of fewer jobs,
worse service, higher rates, deferred maintenance, and greater risks for
trackside communities — while delivering nothing
but bigger payouts
to shareholders.
This merger is a wake-up call: patching the current system with stricter
rules will not solve
the structural problem — a handful of private monopolies controlling essential
infrastructure for profit. The real solution is public ownership, where the rail network is run
for the public good, not quarterly earnings. A nationalized, democratically
accountable rail system could restore
service, protect workers,
lower costs for shippers, and prioritize safety and climate goals. The choice is
clear: keep trying to rein in the robber barons, or take the rails back.
In Summary
Railroads are not just businesses — they are the arteries
of the national economy. We cannot
afford to let them be further monopolized, gutted for profit,
and shielded from accountability by a captured
regulator.
The Norfolk Southern–Union Pacific merger is not just another corporate
deal — it is a direct
threat to workers, communities, and the economy. It is the latest chapter in a
decades-long story of deregulation, monopoly consolidation, and public harm. We
can no longer pretend that this broken system can be fixed with minor tweaks. The time has come for a structural change that puts rail back in the hands of the people it serves. Public ownership of our rail
network is the only way to guarantee safe, reliable, and affordable freight and passenger service, protect good union jobs,
and prioritize climate
and community needs
over shareholder greed. We can keep fighting the same battles against the same monopolies, or we can take the rails back and run them for the public
good. The choice
is ours — and the time is now.
Contact information: Tabitha Tripp info@publicrailnow.org publicrailnow.org